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 century French philosopher, René Descartes, is one of the most 
important Christian thinkers in modern philosophy. His ideas on dualism and 
metaphysics (in general) have been of great interest to both philosophers and 
religionists. In this piece, I do not discuss Christianity or its influence on 
Descartes as such. I analyse presentations of God and the demon in Cartesian 
philosophy (as specifically found in his Meditations) and how they compare with 
the conceptions of God and the demon in indigenous Akan philosophy. Using the 
qualitative method, I also examine some implications of both the Cartesian and 
Akan notions of God and the demon in relation to moral responsibility. While 
acknowledging that both philosophies contain the ideas of God and the demon, I 
seek to show that there are significant differences which make it difficult to 
equate Akan conceptions of these beings to those of Descartes. I establish in this 
research that the Akan conception of the demon, unlike the Cartesian, is two-
sided. Consequently, I caution against the uncritical adoption of non-African 
concepts in the interpretation of African beliefs, values and practices. 
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Introduction 
The need to particularise African philosophical studies and 
research has aptly been indicated by Kwasi Wiredu in his Cultural 
Universals and Particulars.
1
 He has also reiterated this in his call for 
conceptual decolonization of African philosophy and religion.
2
 In 
furtherance of this course, research such as this one – in which the beliefs 
and concepts of a particular African culture are presented and their 
distinctness shown – is crucial.  
As a result of human curiosity and the search for meaning in life, 
thinkers in different cultures and religious traditions have attempted to 
provide some responses in relation to the nature and ultimate sources of 
goodness and evil to the human being. Even though a human being could, 
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for instance, act immorally, it is sometimes asked: are there other higher 
beings who might have influenced the human being to act that way? And 
how are such beings, if they exist, to be determined? Very often, these 
questions have led to the postulation of some notions of God and the 
demon – as the embodiments, and real sources, of goodness and evil 
respectively. The introduction of the notions of God and the demon has 
been made possible by a number of reasons. Two of them are worthy of 
mention: first, it is due to the seeming tendency of some human beings to 
adduce metaphysical reasons for that which appear to lie beyond their 
direct control; and, secondly, it is also as a result of the sheer dichotomy 
between good and evil and the belief that aspects of what is good or evil 
(which lie beyond the direct control of the human being) must, by parity of 
reasoning, derive from two contrasting personified beings – viz. God and 
the demon. As we shall soon see, these reasons are, for instance, existent 
in the traditional thought of the Akan people of Ghana. Yet Akan 
philosophy also seems to present a rational basis for the existence of, 
especially, God.
3
 An indigenous Akan thinker‟s offering of the second 
reason as leading to the ideas of God and the demon does not, however, 
make his or her belief in these beings to be entirely different from what 
God and the demon are believed to be in revealed religions.
4
 For, these 
beings are conceived of in such religions as absolutely good and evil 
respectively. It is therefore not surprising that these absolute conceptions 
of a good-God and evil-demon taught in a revealed religion like 
Christianity are in some way maintained and defended by Descartes.
5
  
The discussion in this article shall proceed in the following order: I 
begin with an explanation of how knowledge of God and of His activities 
is thought to be acquired in Cartesian and Akan philosophies; I then 
discuss the same matters in connection with the demon. And, to look at 
where the activities of God and the demon leave the individual, I finally 
examine whether, and how, the human being who is deemed to know right 
and wrong is in some way portrayed in Cartesian and Akan philosophies as 
morally responsible for his or her actions, despite the potencies and 
influences of God and the demon. 
 
Knowledge and Activities of God and the Demon in Cartesian 
Philosophy 
Descartes belongs to a group of philosophers who are described as 
rationalists – a group which is opposed to the philosophical school of 
empiricism. While rationalists argue that reason (but not the senses) is the 
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“real” source of human knowledge, empiricists hold that the only source of 
knowledge is sensory experience. Together, rationalism and empiricism 
constitute the main schools of thought, when it comes to the problem of 
knowledge, in Western philosophy. Nevertheless, one should not be 
surprised to learn that rationalists, and for that matter metaphysians, value 
less the empirical world or experiences, yet they apparently depend on 
these to advance their position that: there is not just a metaphysical realm, 
but that reality must be sought from that realm. This is just the way 





Descartes discusses how God can be known (that is, the origin of 
the idea of God) and the activities He performs in almost all his six 
Meditations. In the “First Meditation”, he introduces the idea of God on 
the basis of his past beliefs concerning God – as a perfect being, as creator 
and good.
7
 Yet, he acknowledges, most importantly, that he undergoes the 
unpleasant experience of deception
8
 contrary to the nature of the good-God 
who created him. At the same level of belief (as in belief which is 
prevalent in the society in which he has been brought up) he presupposes a 
superhuman, potent demon responsible for the deception he experiences 
and the erroneous decisions that result from it.
9
 However, since belief is 
not knowledge, he begins to account for the knowledge of God in the 
Third Meditation.  
In the Third Meditation, he argues for the innateness of the idea of 
God purely from a logical point of view. That: if an object „A‟ has a 
property „B‟ which it did not generate on its own, then, some other object 
„C‟ which alone is capable of causing B might have produced B in A. He 
writes: 
 
By the name God I understand a substance that is infinite 
[eternal, immutable], independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, and 
by which I myself and everything else, if anything else does 
exist, have been created. Now all these characteristics are such 
that the more diligently I attend to them, the less do they appear 
capable of proceeding from me alone; hence from what has been 
already said, we must conclude that God necessarily exists. For 
although the idea of substance is within me owing to the fact that 
I am a substance, nevertheless I should not have the idea of an 
infinite substance – since I am finite – if it had not proceeded 
from some substance which was veritably infinite.
10
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Knowledge of God, Descartes suggests, is not something a human being 
acquires by his or her own effort, but apparently by the prior inscription of 
the idea of God (by God Himself) on the mind of the person. And that the 
human being is able to know this when he or she comprehends the logical 
impossibility for a finite (human) being to cause an idea or a thing which is 
infinite. But this human being who is the subject of knowledge is nothing 
but the mind itself (Second Meditation). Only God, then, according to 
Descartes could have caused the idea of His own infinite beingness in 
humans. This ties in well with the rationalist goal of identifying the nature 
of things that have “real” existence with the metaphysical, rational realm. 
In other words, having used almost entirely the First Meditation to show 
that sensory experiences are deceptive (and so empirical knowledge is 
false), he seeks to point out that a metaphysical being such as God could 
be known with certainty not through sensory experience, but human reason 
alone. Human reason or mind is, according to Descartes, not part of the 
human body and vice versa (Second and Sixth Meditations). 
Another important reason offered by Descartes why God alone could 
have created him is that he is fallible and dislikes his fallibility. 
Consequently, he could not have created himself in a way that (as he 
knows now) displeases him. Descartes argues: 
 
 
... if I had been the author of my own existence, I should not at 
least have denied myself the things which are the more easy to 
acquire [to wit, many branches of knowledge of which my nature 
is destitute]; nor should I have deprived myself of any of the 




However, given that Descartes‟ attempt to assess the quality of his 
knowledge could be understood as an attempt to tell the quality of the 
knowledge of the human being, he seems to be suggesting also that human 
beings, generally, would be quite dissatisfied with their fallibility and, 
thus, must have been created by some other being.  
Yet in the Fourth Meditation, Descartes postulates some goodness 
in his fallibility, suggesting that since God wants him to have what is 
good, it is probably in his interest to be fallible.
12
 In support of this 
position, he first admits that the human mind is limited in its capacity to 
understand the workings of God (and to know the truth about all things). 
He, however, proceeds to recommend that when the fallible human being 
is considered, not separately, but within the totality of God‟s creatures, His 
perfection in creating such a human being should still be affirmed. The 
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fallibility or, generally, the limitations of the human being might just be 
necessary for different parts of God‟s creations to work together for the 
good or, at least, for them to be made sense of. As he advances, „I cannot 
deny that He may have produced many other things, or at least that He has 




Part of what it means for something to be perfect, Descartes 
observes, is that the thing in question should be true and exist always. And, 
since God is regarded by him as perfect, Descartes then claims in the Fifth 
Meditation that God‟s existence is a necessity. Meaning, it is, as a matter 
of logic, impossible for there to be a God who does not exist, since 
existence is the essence of God. 
 
Concerning the Demon 
In the Meditations, even though the existence of the demon and the 
negative influences of the demon on the human being are maintained by 
Descartes, the argument he offers in support of these are not as extensive 
as those of God.  
Knowledge of the demon (“malignant demon”) is based on the 
abstraction that since God could not be interested in deceiving him 
(Descartes), there must be another being who is interested in doing so.
14
 
And, going by the attributes Descartes awards to the demon, it is evident to 
him that the demon does not only exist but is, indeed, the source of his 
deceptions. He conceives of the demon as “some deceiver or other, very 
powerful and very cunning, whoever employs his ingenuity in deceiving 
me.”
15




From the foregoing, the activities of God and the demon can be 
summarized as follows: God is perceived, among other attributes, as 
creator, origin of perfection and goodness, and as a being who is interested 
in the welfare of humans. On the other hand, the demon is perceived as 
evil, interested in deception, skilful in leading human beings astray and, 
thus, not a promoter of human well-being.  
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Knowledge and the Activities of God and the Demon in Akan 
Philosophical Thought  
 
Concerning God 
God is known as Onyame or Onyankopↄn in Akan language. 
Knowledge of His existence is not based on pure reason (a priorism) but 
on reflections regarding this partly empirical world and/or human 
experiences. As a result, knowledge of God and the general nature of Akan 
religion are often described as naturalistic.
17
 There are, nonetheless, some 
sources of indigenous knowledge that, if not properly understood, could 
mislead one into thinking that knowledge of Onyankopↄn is a priori. One 
such source is proverbs. There is, for instance, an Akan proverb that: “Obi 
nkyerε abↄfra Onyame” which literally means “no one teaches God to a 
child”. This initially seems to suggest innate knowledge of God, since it 
might be supposed that if no one teaches God to a child, then, he or she 
might have known God or had the idea of God before coming into this 
world. But the proper interpretation of the proverb is that “the child, being 
a rational being, would come to the realization of God as he or she matures 
and, thus, gains more awareness of himself or herself, the environment and 
the nature of the world.”
18
  
This implies that knowledge of God is not devoid of empirical 
considerations. It also suggests that while human knowledge of God could 
be seen as naturalistic, it is not devoid of reason. For, it is held that a 
critical reflection on the natural world could or should lead the human 
being to knowledge of the existence of Onyame. The difference between 
the Akan perspective and the Cartesian doctrine of rationalism is that the 
latter, unlike the former, emphasizes the capacity of the human mind (on 
its own) to lead the human being to the knowledge of God independently 
of experience. Although many humans do not ordinarily split up reason 
and experience as distinct sources of knowledge, the philosophical 
relevance – or is it? – of the doctrine of rationalism is exactly its attempt to 
do so, in addition to its suggestion that sensory experience must not be 
relied on for “real” knowledge.
19
 And, this is what Descartes dedicates the 
First and Second Meditations to showing.  
 
Concerning the Demon 
The idea of the demon, in Akan thought, requires careful analysis. 
Unlike in Cartesian thought where just one demon, the “evil genius”, is 
postulated, the demon has two representations in Akan philosophy. These 
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are ↄbonsam and sasabonsam. While ↄbonsam is believed to be a spiritual, 
personified being who is offensive in his dealings with humans, 
sasabonsam is really not. On the basis of the original belief that 
sasabonsam was a sort of an earthly beast (so to speak) – residing in thick 
forests which were not too far from the abodes of humans in the olden 
days – one can assert that knowledge of sasabonsam was empirical, or at 
least was so intended. The same cannot be said of ↄbonsam who has 
always been conceived to be a spirit. There are no material presentations 
of ↄbonsam, except that (i) in some minimal sense, some accidents 
(akwanhyia) and temptations (nsohwε) that befall humans in the natural 
world are traced to ↄbonsam, and (ii) literally and metaphorically, someone 
seen to be the source of trouble or temptation to another may be described 
as ↄbonsam. 
 
Activities of Onyame, Ↄbonsam and Sasabonsam 
Onyame is conceived as a good being who does not only intend, 
but does, good things for the human being. In this sense, it is often said 
“Nyame yε” (God is good). Indeed, Gyekye confirms the good naturedness 
of God.
20
 He is believed to have created the universe, as a result of which 
He is referred to as bↄrebↄre (creator).
21
 He is also eternal (ↄdomankoma) 
and omnipotent (otumfoↄ). His omnipresence is expressed in the maxim 
“Nyame bewu na mawu” (“if God will die, then I will also die”) where “I” 
means “my soul”.
22
 This implies that the human being is primarily 
spiritual. The maxim is said in the context of immortality of both God 
(who is also believed to be a spirit [sunsum]) and the human being 
(ↄdasani). These are some of the activities associated with God in Akan 
thought which are relevant for this piece. 
Ↄbonsam, however, is associated with evil (bↄne). Ↄbonsam, being 
a spirit, is not perceptible and is believed to take delight in misleading 
humans to commit errors (nfomsoↄ) and evil deeds (nyuma bↄne). To a 
great extent, ↄbonsam‟s character is similar to that of the Cartesian evil 
genius and the Christian Satan. Even though Satan, like all spirits, is 
conceived as the son of God (Hebrew 12:9, Job 1:6), his activities bring 
him closer to the Cartesian evil genius because he is seen as a ruler of 
some sort who depends on sin and deception (Revelation 12:9); as devil 
(Mathew 4:1); tempter (Mathew 4:3); liar and father of lies (John 8:44); 
and the adversary of the human being (1 Peter 5:8). However, sasabonsam 
does not seek after humans in order to deceive or harm them, although it is 
believed to harm humans who come across it in the forest. This demon is 
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presented in Akan culture as a fearsome being residing in deep forests. Yet 
since sasabonsam cannot be found in any “deep forests” (which, by the 
way, are not quite common today), it has attained a mythical status in 
Akan culture. It is conceived to be a being so huge, powerful, strong and 
fearsome that the no spiritual powers of dwarfs
23
 – let alone the capacities 
of the less potent human beings – can match its powers. This is expressed 
in a famous maxim εnyε mmoatia aduosonson yↄnko ne sasabonsam a 
w’abu akyakya (meaning, a hunchbacked sasabonsam is mightier than 
seventy-seven dwarfs). This maxim is often used to express the relativity 
of ability in human life; very often, the subjugation of inferior force to a 
stronger one whenever they clash.  
In Akan mythology, sasabonsam is sometimes conceived in human 
form as well. There is a well-known myth about how a woman who found 
the former‟s child in the forest and brought her home. Thinking that the 
child‟s hair was overgrown, the woman shaved the child. When 
sasabonsam found out, he got angry and asked the woman to fix back 
every single strand of hair that had been shaved off by her or else, he was 
going to take the woman‟s child with him into the forest. To cut a long 
narration short, the woman was saved by her imbecile child who – 
apparently, being sensible for the first time – asked sasabonsam to cover 
all the footprints he had left on the compound of the mother. In doing so, 
while carrying his child, sasabonsam naturally (but reluctantly) went 
backwards until he found himself once again in the forest with his child. 
Since then, sasabonsam has lived in the forest but has resolved to harm 
humans as a form of retaliation.  
There are critical observations that one can make about the myth 
above. First, the evil activities of sasabonsam towards humans appear to 
have been partly brought by the latter upon themselves – as seen in the 
woman‟s bringing home and shaving of sasabonsam‟s child. Sasabonsam 
did not originally seek after humans in order to harm them. He is thus 
portrayed as defensive and not offensive. Perhaps, this explains why he 
“lives” in the forest and supposedly attacks humans only when they get 
into the forest. Secondly, respect for the dignity of the human being in 
Akan culture is in some way predicated on the belief that every human 
being is useful. In this light, a relevant maxim like kwasea mpo ho wↄ 
mfasoↄ (“even the imbecile is useful”) finds expression in the role played 
by the woman‟s child in the myth above. Thirdly, sasabonsam is indeed 
different from ↄbonsam since the former does not seek after humans to 
deceive or harm.  
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The interpretations given above of the ideas of God and the demon 
provide some basis for anyone seeking to explain or reflect on concepts in 
African thought, to be careful in the use of ideas and terms that reflect the 
cultural and intellectual realities of non-Africans. This is not to suggest 
that all African cultures share the same set of beliefs, values and practices, 
but that in researching any African culture, ideas should be presented in a 
way that depicts its worldview. 
 
Knowledge of Right and Wrong and the Question of Moral 
Responsibility: Some Cartesian and Akan Conceptions 
In the Second Meditation, Descartes identifies the human being as 
a rational being – a being that thinks, and is also aware of his or her 
thinking capacity.
24
 This rational being is also described by Descartes as a 
soul,
25
 “a mind” or “an understanding” or “a reason”.
26
 Being rational, one 
would have thought that it would be reasonable for Descartes to consider 
the human being as fully aware and in charge of the decisions he or she 
makes – whether or not the decisions are moral. However, Descartes 
mentions the evil genius in the „First‟ and „Second‟ Mediations as the 
cause of the wrong judgements he makes. He only begins to blame or 
attribute error, especially in terms of human moral inadequacies, to the 
human being in the Fourth Meditation where errors are partly due to the 
failure to exercise human reason. He acknowledges that error – which 
includes such negative choices as evil and wrong actions – is in part due to 
human fallibility (in the first place). This is good. Yet, he seems in this 
Meditation to identify the real cause of negative choices with the failure to 
exercise right human reason, believing strongly that the right exercise of 
reason – viz. not choosing what one wills over what one clearly 
understands – helps the human being to overcome his or her fallibility. 
This implies that although a person is fallible, what really leads him or her 
to negative choices is lack of good knowledge of the choices. He states: 
And certainly there can be no other source than that which I have 
explained; for as often as I so restrain my will within the limits of 
my knowledge that it forms no judgement except on matters 
which are clearly and distinctly presented to it by the 
understanding, I can never be deceived; for every clear and 
distinct conception is without doubt something, and hence cannot 
derive its origin from what is naught, but must of necessity have 
God as its author – God, I say, who being supremely perfect, 
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This Cartesian conception of error or evil is quite different from that of the 
Akan. Descartes seems to suggest that one does wrong only because one 
chooses an action which one does not fully understand, or rather, does not 
really know to be good. He indeed emphasizes this point with the view that 
it is the human will that “easily falls into error and sin, and chooses the 
evil for the good, or the false for the truth”
28
 and consequently, makes him 
sin or fall into error. But a cause of evil recognized in Akan philosophical 
thought is reason itself: that humans sometimes choose wrong actions 
knowingly. It is held that human knowledge of right actions alone is not 
enough for a person to avoid acting or choosing wrongly. For instance, a 
human being would sometimes knowingly choose a wrong action. This 
may happen when one is faced with nsↄhwε (temptations) or when one 
wants to achieve some non-moral end. 
It is not too surprising why Descartes eventually plays down the 
prominence of human fallibility. His objective seems to be to project the 
absolute perfection of God. However, there is less potential for this to be 
achieved with how he approaches the question of fallibility. In other 
words, even though I recognize that his argument about the failure to 
exercise right reason appears to absolve God from blame, at least for now, 
the suppression of the fallibility problem does not help Descartes‟ course. 
That is, the failure to exercise right reason, it may be said, implies that the 
human being chooses against God‟s provisions (and mercies to the human 
being) since he or she relies on the will (not reason) to commit evil. And 
this seems to make the human being the author of his or her own deeds. On 
the contrary, the fact that Descartes admits, in the first place, that the 
human being is fallible – despite his (Descartes‟) attempt to overlook it as 
a problem to his project – readily brings in the question of why an 
imperfect, “incomplete” human being, created so by God, should be held 
responsible for his or her deeds at all. It then brings in the difficult 
problem of evil which Descartes recognizes in some way but which is 
refused its implications to affect the goodness and perfection of God.
29
 So, 
in spite of the fact that he realises that God‟s permission for him to be 
deceived – partly because he is fallible – could be contrary to the goodness 
of God,
30
 he is careful not to leave the argument at this. He does not 
expressly discuss further the negative implications of human fallibility but 
it makes sense to assume that he is probably aware of some such 
implications. He accordingly introduces the idea of the “real cause” of 
error which, comfortably, blames human error on the failure of the human 
being to exercise right reason. Yet there is no reason for me to believe that 
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the exercising of right reason argument takes away the implications of the 
problem of evil on Descartes‟ conception of God completely. For it may 
still be asked how an omnipotent God who dislikes evil could create a 
being who would have the opportunity not only to choose bad actions but 
also have such actions in the world to choose from. This is not to deny 
Descartes‟ position that if we should examine the perfection of God in 
general (“creational”) terms but not in terms of specific individual beings 
alone, it is still possible for God to be regarded as good and perfect. I think 
he has a point here. 
To the extent that there is in Akan philosophy the conception of 
God as good and omnipotent, and that the human being is seen as 
imperfect and created by God, the problem of evil cannot logically be 
absent from Akan philosophy. For there is, in addition to these, evil in the 
Akan universe. Thus, Akan philosophy shares this feature with the 
Cartesian exposition on God. 
However, the idea held in Akan philosophy that the human mind 
may “fully” understand the immorality of an action and yet go ahead to 
choose or perform it brings an interesting dimension to Akan moral 
thought. By “fully” I do not mean innately or “rationally” (as used by 
Descartes), since Akan ethics is not supernaturalistic but humanistic.
31
 But 
by “fully understand” I mean a situation where a person is aware as a 
result of practical knowledge or human living, in which reason and that 
which is reasonable to do are neither devoid of experience nor necessarily 
innate. While the idea that a person could knowingly (but not as a matter 
of will) choose wrong actions might exist in other cultures or held by some 
individuals, it is not necessarily the case with Descartes. Of course, 
Descartes is not arguing that when a person commits a crime, for instance, 
he or she should not be punished. He is rather interested in telling the real 
cause of the crime which he does not associate with reason, but the will. 
He argues, as seen above, that it is the human will, not reason, which really 
makes a person choose evil. In the Second Meditation, he establishes – and 
maintains throughout the rest of the Meditations – that the mind (reason) is 
not part of the body and that anything the mind knows is innate, real and 
always true but that which we depend on our body (especially the senses) 
to know is potentially false. It is in this context that reason is offered by 
him as the source of real things such as the mind (Second Meditation), 
God (Third Meditation and Fifth Meditation), truth (Fourth Meditation) 
and mathematical properties (Fifth Meditation). Descartes is quite aware of 
the potential objection that what he is attributing to reason here might be 
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wishful thinking; because the fact, for instance, that he feels he innately 
knows of the existence of God does not mean that the mind might not be 
deceiving him. And, in order to block such an objection, he advances that 
anything the mind knows is true, real and can never be false. Due to this, it 
would be inconsistent for the same reason to lead a person to knowledge of 
something which is unreal, false, and evil. If a human being sticks to the 
use of reason, Descartes suggests, he or she avoids evil and errors; but if 
the will (or body) is relied upon, these negative results will be obtained.   
Descartes therefore implies that when a person does not really 
understand or know (the moral status of) an action and he or she chooses 
it, he or she chooses that which is evil. I reiterate that in Descartes 
thinking, any such choice is based on pseudo knowledge or incomplete 
understanding which emanates from the will, but not reason. The Akan 
position is rather that: neither God (Onyame), nor ↄbonsam nor 
sasabonsam nor human fallibility nor the capacity to choose what one does 
not understand captures adequately the cause and/or justification of the 
moral choices of the human being. The list is incomplete without the 
acknowledgement of the point that there could be real (rational) 
knowledge of bad actions; and that real knowledge of bad actions does not 
necessarily lead to the avoidance of immorality and vice versa. An 
objection might be raised that human fallibility suffices as the cause of all 
immoral choices of human beings. This is true to the extent that humans 
can act immorally only if they are capable of doing so. However, if we 
need to teach the human being how best to act or how to avoid the 
things/beings that can lead him or her to act morally (or otherwise), then, 
knowledge of human fallibility is not enough. Also, contrary to Descartes, 
the real cause of immorality is not necessarily the exercising of the will 
but, sometimes, reason itself. Indeed, knowledge of a wrong action 
(followed by the decision to perform it) also makes it more reasonable to 
hold an individual responsible for his or her actions in a more direct 
manner than the Cartesian idea of failure to understand the (bad) nature of 
actions and/or their implications.
32
 Otherwise, it may legitimately be asked 
why the human being should be held responsible for that which he or she 
does not know? Thus, for a philosopher like Descartes who grounds ideas 
and actions on reason or understanding, it becomes more baffling that in 
his ethics, he predicates moral responsibility on lack of understanding. 
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Conclusion 
The paper has done a comparison between Cartesian and Akan 
philosophies in terms of the concepts of God and the demon. It has been 
established that both concepts are existent in both philosophies, even 
though there are some significant differences, especially, with regard to the 
demon. For instance, the Akan conception of the demon is two-fold unlike 
the unitary conception in Cartesian philosophy. This difference 
unavoidably affects the kinds of activities that are attributed to the demon 
in the contrasted philosophies. The paper has also examined how the 
activities of God and the demon affect the human being, spelling out how 
these determine the levels of human responsibility for moral actions in 
both philosophies. A key observation which has been made here is that 
while God is held as good, perfect and the creator of the universe in both 
philosophies, He is not held responsible for the moral shortcomings of the 
human being. It is the human being who is considered responsible for his 
or her actions. The rationalistic Cartesian position bases the responsibility 
for a bad action, for instance, on the human being‟s inability to understand 
moral actions (or to follow reason), as he or she rather follows the 
judgement of the will. However, in Akan thought, knowledge or 
understanding of immoral actions (but not submission to the will) is the 
real basis for human responsibility.  
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